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Abstract
The European Commission proposes to replace the current system of
taxing corporate income of separate accounting by a two-step ’consolidate
and apportionment’ procedure. This paper uses a large set of unconsoli-
dated firm-level data to assess the likely impact on corporate tax revenues
in each Member State. Taking pre-tax profit as given, overall tax revenues
would be likely to drop by 2.5% if companies can choose whether to par-
ticipate. By contrast, if they were forced to participate, total tax revenues
would be likely to increase by more than 2%, leaving some European coun-
tries, and most notably Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom better off.
We investigate how sensitive these results are to the apportionment factors
used.
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It is clear that, although the concept of a common tax base for
companies operating in the EU now seems to be well established
as a long-term goal for EU tax policy and generally widely supported,
some parties in both business and tax administrations remain
totally opposed to it as a matter of principle.
’Bolkestein Report’ (2003), p. 19
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the likely impact on corporation tax revenues in EU
member states of the introduction of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB). Such a reform has been under discussion by the European Com-
mission and member states for several years: see, for example, Commission of
the European Communities (2001, 2003, 2007a, 2007b) and Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa
(2006). Specifically, we assess the impact of two elements of the CCCTB: the
consolidation of taxable income within the EU, and the apportionment of that
taxable income to member states. We do not model the introduction of a single
definition of the tax base; instead we base our analysis on estimates of taxable
income between 2000 and 2004.
We use a large dataset containing unconsolidated firm level accounting data
and ownership data. We analyse the position of individual companies through-
out the European Union, including companies which are members of multina-
tional groups. We construct estimates of the tax liabilities which those compa-
nies would face under various hypothetical tax reforms, and examine the effect
such changes would have on the tax revenues of each of the EU member states.
The tax reforms analysed in the paper are based on the design of the
proposed common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), as set out in
Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa (2006) and Commission of the European Communities (2007).
These documents build on the proposals contained in what is commonly known
as the Bolkestein Report (2003), which clearly stated the EU’s preference for
a common consolidated tax base and formula apportionment. There have been
attempts to instigate EU cooperation in corporate taxation for many decades,
and various proposals for forms of harmonisation have been made. However,
since the Ruding Committee report (1992), the European Commission appears
to have been developing a strategy of gradually addressing specific problems,
with only a long-run objective of full harmonisation. The 2001 report of the
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European Commission (2001) stated this most clearly and led to the Bolkestein
Report two years later.1
In analysing versions of the current proposals, we make one important sim-
plifying assumption. We assume that corporations do not change their be-
haviour in response to the tax reform. This is clearly an extreme assumption,
but provides a useful benchmark for analysis. In any case, it is less arbitrary
than choosing specific behavioural responses. Given this assumption, we cal-
culate the pre-tax profit from the tax payments declared in unconsolidated
financial accounts as the measure of taxable profit in that company. We hold
this fixed, but allow companies to offset losses within the group. The total
group profits are then allocated to individual Member States, and are taxed at
that country’s tax rate - which we assume is unchanged. We use data on profits
from 2000 to 2004. We consider the hypothetical case in which the tax reform
occurred in beginning of the year 2000, and trace through the impact that the
reform would have had in the succeeding five years.
The introduction of a new consolidation and apportionment system would
have two effects. First, loss-making companies could benefit from international
loss consolidation to the extent to which they could offset losses against con-
temporaneous profits made by other companies within the same group in other
countries. However, assuming that losses can only be used once, the firm would
only be better off to the extent that this immediate consolidation was of greater
value than carrying forward the loss to set against its own profit in a subse-
quent period. Second, the effects of the apportionment of group taxable profit
to specific Member States depends on where the profit is allocated and the set
of tax rates consequently applied. Companies could be better or worse off, and
if permitted could therefore choose whether or not to be taxed under the for-
mula apportionment system.
If companies are permitted to choose whether or not to participate in the
new system, they will do so only if they benefit from lower aggregate taxes. If
they correctly anticipate their tax liabilities under the new system, this implies
that total tax revenues must decline. However, two questions remain: how far
do overall tax revenues decline, and what is the distribution of tax revenue
effects across Member States? The base case results presented here indicate
1See Nicodeme (2007) for an overview of the harmonisation process of the direct taxation
in the European Union.
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that, under these circumstances, overall EU tax revenues would decline by only
approximately 2.5%. Some new Member States - such as the Slovak Republic,
Hungary and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic - would gain increased tax
revenue. By contrast, Germany would see a significant reduction in its tax rev-
enue.
However the position would be very different if companies were not given
the opportunity to choose whether to participate. Our central estimate is that
this would lead to an increase in overall tax revenues of 2%. While a number of
countries would gain in this case, Spain would gain significant revenues while
Finland would lose significant revenues.
The most recent document (Commission of the European Communities,
2007) propose four factors be used in apportionment, but does not state the
precise weights to be used. We assess these apportionment factors individually
to identify the distributive effects of each factor. Our results show that the
design of the apportionment factor is important in affecting the overall level of
revenues, and its distribution across Member States. One of the most signifi-
cant differences is in the treatment of the factor based on labour. Given the
large dispersion in wage rates across the EU, the allocation of taxable profit
to Member States would be very different if it were based on the number of
employees as opposed to total wage costs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
literature review. The data are presented in Section 3 and the methodology in
Section 4. The results of the base case are given in Section 5, while Section 6
examines a number of alternative specifications. The last Section concludes.
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However, it would be unrealistic to expect Member States
to enter into negotiations on a new method without
a comparison between the old (separate accounting)
and the new (formula apportionment).
’Bolkestein Report’ (2003) p. 23
2 Literature
In a early theoretical contribution Musgrave (1972) pointed out that formula
apportionment could mitigate the problem of the internal pricing within multi-
national corporations and proposed that United States should consider to ex-
tend their system to international investment.2 This was followed by the work
of McLure (1980, 1981) and Gordon and Wilson (1986) which established the
distortions arising from an allocation formula. Along these lines Goolsbee and
Maydew (2000) argue that apportionment according to payroll exhibits the
same effects as a labour tax. Anand and Sansing (2000) develop a theoretical
model of tax competition in apportionment rules amongst the US states.3
The proposal of the EU Commission to apply a formula apportionment sys-
tem for the European Union led to several contributions, including Devereux
(2004), Sørensen (2004) and Mintz and Weiner (2003), who discuss the po-
tential of alternative proposals. Weiner (2002) and Gerard and Weiner (2003)
investigate the impact of introducing the formula apportionment system on the
European Union Member States. The latter paper is the first theoretical model
to account for international loss consolidation combined with the formula ap-
portionment.4
However, empirical research in this topic is scarce, with just two studies
investigating the effects of a move to formula apportionment. Shackelford and
Slemrod (1998) consider the hypothetical reform of extending the US formula
apportionment system to include income derived in other countries. Based
on a sample of 46 US multinational companies, they concluded that formula
apportionment would increase the tax payments by 38%. However, they did
not allow for international loss consolidation.
2See also Weltzer (1995) for a discussion of this issue.
3A different strand of literature is concerned with the influence of the formula apportion-
ment as compared to the separate accounting system on tax competition. See Eggert and
Schjelderup (2003), Nielsen et al. (2001, 2003) Pethig and Wagener (2003) or Riedel and
Runkel (2007) for the interaction of the two tax systems.
4See Martens-Weiner (2006) for a comprehensive overview.
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More recently, in a study most similar to this one, Fuest et al. (2007) assess
the impact of the EU proposals for international loss consolidation and formula
apportionment using company level data on German inbound and outbound
foreign direct investment. Their main conclusion is that international loss con-
solidation and formula apportionment would lead to an overall reduction in
corporation tax revenue in the EU of approximately 20%. Larger countries
would benefit at the expense of smaller low-tax countries.
These results differ from the ones we present below. Apart from the different
dataset, one reason we can identify is the treatment of the time dimension in the
loss offset against taxable profit. Typically, a loss-making company can carry
forward a loss into subsequent years to offset against future profit. But if the
loss is used up by consolidation with profits elsewhere in a group of companies,
it would no longer be available to carry forward. Consolidation in the current
year therefore requires an adjustment to taxable profit declared in subsequent
periods, which will imply higher tax revenues. Our results suggest that this is
an important factor in determining the overall effect of the proposals on tax
revenues in the medium to long term.5
We also consider a number of other factors not included in the Fuest et al
(2007) study. The current EU proposal is that the new tax system will be volun-
tary - that is, multinational companies within the European Union can choose
whether or not to be taxed in this way. While we are interested in the revenue
effects of the voluntary character, van der Horst et al. (2007) stress the impor-
tance of the participation decision. Using a general equilibrium framework, they
argue, that only full participation can mitigate an uneven level playing ground,
hence a voluntary character of the proposal could lead to further distortions.
For our research question the main implication of the voluntary participation
is an increased downward pressure on the Member State tax revenues. Ab-
stracting from compliance costs, we assume that multinationals will not choose
to pay higher taxes. This should bound the resulting total tax revenues to be
no higher the than the current one. Another aspect of the proposals which we
investigate is the position of two EU companies (or groups of companies) which
are owned by the same non-EU parent company. A system of consolidation of
profits within the EU may or may not permit the losses of one of these compa-
nies to be offset against the profits of the other. We consider both possibilities
and compare the outcomes.
5See Niemann and Treisch (2005) for a simulation model of the loss consolidation system
introduced within Austria, accounting for the fact that losses can only be used once.
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The current distribution of the tax base, at the
individual company level, is not publicly available.
Even if it were, the amount of work required
in recalculating real company data to arrive
at the new tax base distribution is daunting.
’Bolkestein Report (2003) p. 24
3 The Data
To assess the effects of the proposed apportionment rules we draw on the largest
set of firm level data available: Orbis, provided by the Bureau van Dijk.6 This
dataset provides summary information from financial accounts as well as de-
tailed data on ownership of companies. The ownership data are vital in this
exercise, in order to trace out companies which are members of multinational
groups. We include all companies registered in one of the 25 pre-2007 EU Mem-
ber States which report total assets of at least 2 million Euros in at least two
consecutive years between 2001 and 2005.7 We include only companies which
report enough data to undertake the analysis below. This procedure has some
importance, as some countries - including Ireland and Greece - do not report
the number of employees for all years and do not report the cost of employees at
all. As Ireland is of particular interest for this study we simulate values of em-
ployees and the cost of employees for Irish companies.8 Despite this procedure
there are still some important Irish companies for which we can not generate
a reliable estimate of employment data and which are therefore dropped. To
test the importance of this, we repeat the whole exercise without apportion-
ing according to employment factors and report the results where they differ
substantially. Although the size of the sample varies from year to year and
depending on the data requirements, as an example, we present in Table 1 de-
scriptive statistics for the year 2003. This indicates that we use data on just
over 400,000 companies in 2003.
6Note, that the data we use contains only financial accounts, which might differ substan-
tially from tax return data, if countries operate a two book system. Unfortunately so far there
is no comprehensive dataset with tax return data available. See Table A.1 and Table A.2 in
the appendix for more detailed information on which data are included in ORBIS.
7Due to computational restrictions we restrict ourselves to these largest companies. Our
total sample consists of 930,588 companies.
8First,where possible, we use information for sector specific labour costs from the Eurostat
database to fill missing entries in the number of employees or the cost of employees respectively.
Second, we assume a constant ratio of number of employees to total assets to fill missing entries
for the number of employees. A detailed description of the used procedure is available from
the authors on request.
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Identifying corporate groups: We draw on the full sample to identify
the group structures. We include a company as part of a corporate group if
the database reports a majority corporate shareholder (more than 50 % direct
or indirect shareholding) that is within our sample. Further a company is con-
sidered to be part of a group if the database reports a global corporate owner
which itself has a BvD identification number.9 In the case where the database
reports no information about ownership we screen the dataset for a number of
names of large corporate groups and are able to match additionally approxi-
mately 1400 companies with 257 different parents.
Our definition of being part of a group is likely to underestimate the abso-
lute number of companies within corporate groups for two reasons. First we
exclude very small companies altogether. Second, for a significant number of
companies, the database does not report any information on ownership. While
we are able to attribute the most well known firms to their global ultimate
owner by name, we are likely to miss the less obvious firms. Nevertheless we
are able to attribute just over 30% of the companies to corporate (global) own-
ers and therefore identify them as being part of a group. Table 1 breaks down
the sample according to the ownership. It can be seen that the largest group
of companies are those that are independent - that is they are not owned by
a corporate parent, neither do they own any subsidiaries.10 Of course, these
companies will be unaffected by the tax reforms analysed here: they cannot off-
set losses against profits of another company, and there is no need for formula
allocation.11
The most interesting subsample consists of almost 50,000 companies that
are part of an international group with companies in more than one EU Mem-
ber State. This number includes the parents in column [4] and the subsidiaries
in column [6] in Table 1, whereas the latter column also includes subsidiaries
of non-European multinationals if they are operating in more than one EU
Member State. The companies in columns [3] and [5] form domestic corporate
9This restriction to only global owners with a BvD identification number ensures that we
do not identify companies owned by individuals or public bodies as groups.
10Unfortunately ORBIS contains no information about foreign branches. Therefore parts
of the activities might fall under a different tax jurisdiction, but are attributed to a single
corporate identity.
11Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus are not reported, because there are insufficient companies
in the sample to draw meaningful conclusions. However throughout the whole analysis all
consolidation and apportioning includes companies resident in these countries.
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Table 1: Sample (in 2003) split according to ownership information
Country [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Austria 2,053 1,246 38 41 241 428 59
Belgium 18,339 12,611 512 245 2,164 2,753 54
Czech Republic 7,576 6,707 32 8 47 743 39
Denmark 12,172 8,677 322 114 1,351 1,351 357
Estonia 1,534 1,016 62 13 150 248 45
Finland 7,405 4,660 505 125 1,003 1,093 19
France 75,700 39,849 3,678 413 13,598 13,509 4,653
Germany 15,966 9,826 556 306 2,403 2,676 199
Greece 9,857 8,341 375 24 501 493 123
Hungary 4,053 3,665 12 2 19 342 13
Ireland 2,676 2,306 18 5 60 260 27
Italy 89,468 79,091 1,816 466 3,968 3,740 387
Latvia 841 646 24 2 38 115 16
Lithuania 956 769 30 5 43 83 26
Luxembourg 449 338 6 7 9 85 4
Netherlands 3,771 1,593 38 23 989 1,064 64
Poland 9,726 6,977 314 16 699 1,481 239
Portugal 7,854 6,031 269 25 939 569 21
Slovak Republic 1,751 1,610 3 2 3 130 3
Spain 83,387 64,476 3,366 266 9,460 5,406 413
Sweden 16,757 7,279 817 265 5,254 3,084 58
United Kingdom 40,367 19,957 566 15 7,515 7,598 4,716
Total 412,658 287,671 13,359 2,388 50,454 47,251 11,535
Notes: [1] Total number of observations; [2] Companies not part of a group;
[3] Parents of domestic groups; [4] Parents of EU groups;
[5] Subsidiaries in domestic groups; [6] Subsidiaries in EU groups;
[7] EU subsidiaries of international groups;
groups; they might be affected by a new loss consolidation system since some
countries do not currently permit group relief for domestic groups. This holds
especially true for the companies in column [7] which are operating in only one
European country but are headquartered in a different country.12
Corporate Tax Revenues: Data on corporate tax revenues are taken
from the revenue statistics published by the OECD each year. For non-OECD
countries we use the information about the share of Corporate Tax Revenues in
GDP published in a study by Eurostat (2006). Combined with data about the
12The identified corporate owner is either outside of the European Union or if it is within
the EU is not in our sample.
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nominal GDP from the World Development Indicators we infer the Corporate
Tax Revenues. All values are converted into US dollars at the exchange rate of
the last day of the year.
Tax Data: The information about corporate tax rates and the treatment
of losses stems primarily from the authors’ own research, complemented with
information from PricewaterhouseCoopers, and is summarized in Table A.3 in
the appendix. Apart from the well-known fact that there is a wide dispersion in
statutory corporate tax rates - currently from 10% in Cyprus to 38.3% (includ-
ing local taxes) in Germany - the most important features of the current tax
systems for our purposes are the treatment of losses and the possibility of group
taxation. Whereas all countries allow loss carry forward for at least 5 years only
France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom allow some form
of loss carry back. Loss offset within a (domestic) group is not allowed in most
of the new Member States and some of the old Member States, most notably
Belgium.13 At the other extreme Denmark and very recently Austria allow
consolidation with non-resident companies.
The impact of the choice of apportionment factors: As indicated
below, the choice of apportionment factors can alter the distribution of the
tax base substantially. This is especially true if the distribution of the fac-
tors differs widely from the current distribution of the taxable profits. If a
member state has a disproportionately large share of the factor used for the
apportionment relative to its share of the taxable profits it is likely to gain
from a formula apportionment system. To begin to identify the likely effects
of the different possible apportionment factors, Figure 1 displays the shares of
the apportionment factors relative to the share of the taxable profits. Thus,
for example, if a member state’s share of the apportionment factor were equal
to its share of existing taxable income, Figure 1 would indicate a value of 100%.
It is clear that there is considerable variation in these relative shares, both
between countries and between apportionment factors. Countries with high
taxable income under the existing system relative to the other measures of
economic activity have low shares: these countries include Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This might be due to some profit
shifting into their countries or the existence of headquarters with little eco-
13The group taxation system in Latvia and the United Kingdom are somewhat more gen-
erous as they allow for loss offset within the domestic part of an international group.
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Figure 1: Country shares in the factors used for apportionment in % of
country shares in taxable profits
nomic activity compared to the reported profits. Other things being equal, we
might therefore expect these countries to have a lower allocation of total tax-
able income under the proposed system than under the current system. On the
other hand some of the new Member States have relatively large shares of prop-
erty and employees. Within countries, there can also be significant differences
according to the apportionment factor. Most notably, the differences in the
relative shares of the number of employees compared to the relative shares of
the cost of employees are particularly pronounced for the new member states,
reflecting the fact that average wages across the EU vary widely. However,
there is also significant variation in the relative shares of other factors.
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A programme of total harmonization
is not justified at this stage. None the less
the Committee believes that the adoption
by all Member States of a common system
of corporation tax is a desirable long-term objective.
’Ruding Report’ (1992) p. 11
4 Methodology
The current system: We assume the firms currently optimise their tax pay-
ments i.e. that loss consolidation, loss carry back and forward is exploited
where it is possible and beneficial for a corporate group. As a benchmark case,
we therefore use the reported tax payments in the balance sheet (TAXit) to
model the current system.14 The tax liabilities of a corporate group under the
current separate accounting system in period t are given through
TSAt =
n∑
i=1
TAXit (1)
where i denotes each of the n individual companies in the corporate group.
A formula apportionment system: We do not observe taxable profit
directly. Instead we use the reported tax payment and divide it by the statutory
tax rate (τit) to approximate the taxable profit. However, countries do not
typically allow companies to pay negative taxes, so a non-negligible number of
companies reporting zero tax payments might have taxable losses. We account
for this if the reported tax payment is not positive, by replacing our measure
of the taxable profit with the accounting measure of earnings before interest
and taxation, EBITit, if the accounting measure is lower.15 That is, our basic
measure of taxable profit, piit, is derived as
14Unfortunately it is not clear how far reported tax payments reflect the actual tax pay-
ments, as they might as well include deferred tax payments. However, although we have
attempted to model actual tax payments with various methods, we are not aware of any
method which can convincingly improve on the simple assumption that the tax liability in the
accounting data is a reasonable estimate of the actual tax liability.
15In addition to the use of EBITit one should take into account interest payments and
receipts, as they will influence the tax base. However, as it is not possible to correctly disen-
tangle net from gross interests from our data, we exclude financial profits and losses from our
calculation in order to avoid misleading results.
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piit =
{
TAXit
τit
if TAXit > 0
min
[
TAXit
τit
, EBITit
]
if TAXit ≤ 0
(2)
We assume that the reported tax payment is the result of tax-optimising
behaviour of the corporate group, i.e. that the reported tax payment includes
the loss carried forward from the previous period. The loss carry forward out
of period t is the part of the taxable loss that does not lead to a negative tax
payment. If the company reports a positive tax payment we assume that no
losses have been carried forward. Therefore the loss carry forward (LCFt) can
be written as
LCFit =
{
0 if TAXit > 0
max
[
−EBITit + TAXitτt + LCFit−1, 0
]
if TAXit ≤ 0
(3)
Suppose that under the hypothetical allocation system, a company has a
loss which is offset against the contemporaneous profit of another member of the
group. In this case, the loss is not available to be carried forward to subsequent
years in the original company. We account for this reduction in the loss carried
forward (relative to the existing system, which we observe) by adding back the
’consumed’ loss to profit in subsequent years. If a company claimed group relief
in period t the taxable profit in the next period is increased by the loss which
is offset in the previous period. Hence our measure of taxable income needs to
be adjusted for the loss carry forward and equation (2) needs to be rewritten
as
piit =
{
TAXit
τt
+ LCFit−1 if TAXit > 0
min
[
EBITit,
TAXit
τt
+ LCFit−1
]
if TAXit ≤ 0
(4)
These taxable profits are combined into a group consolidated tax base
(CTBt). We assume that if this consolidated tax base is negative, that the
group loss can be offset against future consolidated group profits. Hence the
tax base to be apportioned is given by
CTBt =
n∑
i=1
piit + CTBt−1 if CTBt−1 < 0 (5)
Denoting the proportion of group taxable profit allocated to country j as θj
the tax burden for the corporate group under the new formula apportionment
system is
12
TFAt =
{ ∑m
j=1CTBtθjtτjt if CTBt > 0
0 if CTBt ≤ 0
(6)
We follow the proposal of Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa (2006) concerning the apportion-
ment factor
θtj =
Xjt∑m
j=1Xjt
(7)
where Xjt is the value of the apportionment factor in country j. To identify
the individual effects of a particular apportionment factor, we consider sepa-
rately the property factor, measured through the tangibles assets (TFAt), the
gross receipts factor, measured as turnover (SALEt) and the payroll factor mea-
sured either through the number of employees (EMPt) or the cost of employees
(CEMPt). Note that we use turnover as a measure of sales, which implies
that this apportionment factor is to be interpreted as sales by origin, rather
than sales by destination. We also present results based on a weighted average
of these factors, as envisioned in Commission of the European Communities
(2007b).
The decision whether to participate: We treat the choice of the corpo-
rate group as to whether or not to participate as irreversible.16 Hence, based on
the hypothetical introduction of the new system in 2000, the firm is deemed to
decide in 2000 whether to participate. In effect, we assume that the corporate
group has full information about the future profit situation until 2004.
Therefore a corporate group compares the tax payments under the current
system with the potential tax payments under a system with international loss
consolidation for all future periods. Participation in the formula apportionment
system is beneficial if the net present value of the tax payments is lower than un-
der the current system. There are other factors that influence the participation
decision, above all the potential reduction of compliance costs.17 Unfortunately
compliance cost under both the current and the hypothetical new system can
not credibly estimated from the data available. Therefore, we restrict the mod-
eling of the participation decision of the corporate group to a comparison of the
sum of the discounted value of the tax payments over the period 2000 to 2004
16This can be motivated by the fact that even under the existing systems companies might
not be permitted to choose every year. For example, in Austria a tax group must be constituted
for at least three years. (See also Niemann and Treisch 2005 p.5.)
17See for example Mintz (2004) for a discussion of the importance of compliance costs
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under the two possibilities.18 Define η as an indicator variable taking the value
one if the corporate group participates in the new system and zero otherwise,
the decision of the corporate group can be written as
η =
 0 if
∑T
t=0
TSAt
(1+ρ)t <
∑T
t=0
TFAt
(1+ρ)t
1 if
∑T
t=0
TSAt
(1+ρ)t >
∑T
t=0
TFAt
(1+ρ)t
(8)
Both under the separate accounting system or under a hypothetical formula
apportionment system a company can have unused corporate losses at the end of
period T . However given that the loss consolidation allows a corporate group to
use the losses earlier against foreign subsidiaries the unused losses accumulated
at the end of period T could be substantially less than under the current system.
So far it is assumed that these losses are irrecoverable. As the alternative
extreme assumption, we suppose that these accumulated losses could be offset
in the very next period. In this case companies would have a tax asset of
accumulated losses (LiT ) that needs to be accounted for. For the current system
we approximate these ’unused’ losses with the loss carry forward as defined in
equation (3).
LSAiT = τjTLCFiT (9)
For the formula apportionment case it is simply the negative consolidated
group tax base carried forward at the end of period T . For simplicity we assume
unchanged apportionment shares for period T + 1. Hence the tax asset can be
written as
LFAiT = max
 m∑
j=1
−τjTCTBT θjT , 0
 (10)
When these taxable assets are taken into account in the participation deci-
sion, we have:
η˜ =
 0 if
(∑T
t=0
TSAt
(1+ρ)t −
∑n
i=1
LSAiT
1+ρ
)
<
(∑T
t=0
TFAt
(1+ρ)t −
LFAiT
1+ρ
)
1 if
(∑T
t=0
TSAt
(1+ρ)t −
∑n
i=1
LSAiT
1+ρ
)
>
(∑T
t=0
TFAt
(1+ρ)t −
LFAiT
1+ρ
) (11)
18For the discount factor ρ we assume a value of 0.05.
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The real role of the apportioning mechanism
in the reform should therefore be something that
allows a ’reasonable’ distribution of taxable profits
across taxing jurisdictions and does not reintroduce
the problems we want to resolve in the first instance.
Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa (2006) p. 86
5 Results
This section presents the results from our base case and compares them to the
existing system. As noted above, we hypothetically assume that the new system
was introduced in the year 2000, and we consider the impact on tax liabilities
in each year from 2000 to 2004 inclusive.
Our base case makes the following assumptions:
(a) two or more companies which share a non-EU parent are permitted to
consolidate profits, even if they are not directly linked through an EU
company.
(b) losses remaining in the consolidated group at the end of 2004 are deemed
to be worthless.
(c) groups are allowed to choose whether or not to participate.
(d) all EU member states introduce the new system.
Table 2 presents the base case results. First, in order to provide a basis
for comparison, column 1 reports the total tax revenue for the 5 years 2000
to 2004 from corporation tax in each country as reported by the OECD or
Eurostat. This ranges from $270 billion in the UK to only $609 million in
Estonia. Column 2 presents the total tax payments in each country for the
same years, as aggregated over our sample of companies. As would be expected,
since we do not have the population of all taxpayers in our sample, the aggregate
tax revenues from our dataset is smaller than the actual total revenues.19 On
average, our sample represents a little under two thirds of total corporation tax
payments. However, the proportion of the total tax revenues varies between
countries.
19It should be noted that the tax revenue data only compares imperfectly to the tax numbers
from the financial accounts.
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It is relatively low in some countries, such as the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg, but higher in others, such as Germany. These differences across countries
reflect the differences in sample size in each country indicated in Table 1.
The next five columns indicate the impact on the aggregate sample tax rev-
enues if the consolidation and formula apportionment system had been intro-
duced in 2000. The columns are based on alternative factors for the allocation
mechanism, identifying the effect of each factor, one at a time. Thus, column
3 indicates the percentage of the existing tax revenue which would have been
raised under the new system if the allocation mechanism had been based on
the value of tangible assets. The remaining columns show the position if the
allocation mechanism were based on turnover (measuring sales by origin), the
number of employees, the total cost of employees, and a weighted average. The
weights are assumed to be one third turnover, one third sales and one sixth of
each number and cost of employees. The overall position for the EU is given
at the foot of each column. These columns are further illustrated in Figure 2.
Each part of the Figure represents one of the apportionment factors - though
the one indicating the relative size of labour indicates both the number of em-
ployees and total labour costs. Each bar represents the percentage shown in the
equivalent column in Table 2. The horizontal line shows the overall effect on
tax revenues, as shown at the foot of the table: so countries with values above
this line gain tax revenue relative to those below the line.
The overall effects on EU tax revenues are rather small. The overall loss in
tax revenue amounts to approximately 2.5% depending on the apportionment
factor used. However, there is a more significant impact for individual member
states. Some countries would see a reduction in tax revenues irrespective of the
apportionment factor: these include Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, Luxembourg and Greece. This at least partly reflects the pattern shown
in Figure 1, which indicated that most of these countries had high current tax-
able income relative to all of the apportionment factors. Denmark, Finland and
Luxembourg, for example, have very low shares of all of the apportionment fac-
tors relative to its current taxable income; it is then not surprising that it tends
to reduce revenue under the proposed system. However, it should be noted that
the scale of the revenue loss is small relative to the shares of the apportionment
factors - this indicates the fact that overall revenue effects also depend on the
structure and profitability of the multinational groups. Ireland, which also has
low relative shares of all the apportionment factors, would not lose at all from
the introduction of the new system under the base case assumptions.
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Obviously, other countries would gain from the new system. The most strik-
ing cases are the United Kingdom, Sweden and some of the new member states,
in particular, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Estonia.
The latter countries experience large increases that deserve some explanation.
Estonia currently does not tax retained earnings, with the consequence that
many companies currently pay no taxes on their profit in that country; not
surprisingly, other things being equal, the taxable income allocated to Esto-
nia would therefore rise under the new system.20 For the other two countries,
their substantial increases are partly driven by the production sites of Volk-
swagen in Slovakia and Audi in Hungary. As this corporate group is mainly
located within Germany, these large increases in tax revenues in the Eastern
European countries come largely to the expense of Germany. In fact, Germany
would tend to raise significantly lower revenue under the new system. Another
reason for this is that we have assumed that participation is voluntary. Corpo-
rate groups tend to opt out if a large share of the profit is likely to be allocated
to a high tax rate country, such as Germany. Italy also comes into the category.
The redistributive impact is most pronounced using the property factor or
the number of employees. Both these factors can be linked to large production
sites in countries with lower labour costs. The gross receipts factor, measured
by turnover in our analysis, is more closely linked to the profits, and therefore
this way of apportioning has a smaller effect on the distribution of tax revenues.
In the lower left part of Figure 2 we compare the tax revenue implications of
apportioning according to the two possible payroll factors. The lighter bars
represent the outcome if the number of employees is used and the darker bars
the use of cost of employees. It is easily observable that the use of number
of employees has an much stronger influence on the tax revenues. In contrast
if the payroll is used, tax revenues would be much lower in low labour cost
countries, notably the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. With
a weighted formula, these three countries still would attract large tax revenues,
although the redistributive effects would be somewhat reduced.
20To avoid misinterpretation we therefore exclude Estonia from the Figures.
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The possibility of including the EU income of non-EU affiliates
in the water’s edge report has received scant attention
so far and its implications deserve thorough consideration.
EU Commission (2006) p. 30
6 Alternative Scenarios
In this section we investigate how sensitive the base case results are to variations
in the main assumptions made. We consider, one by one, five alternatives to
the base case assumptions. Specifically, we assume that:
(a) accumulated losses in 2004 can be set against profit arising in 2005. This
is effectively the opposite of the base case, where we assumed that such
losses could never be used.
(b) tax rebates are not actually paid out under the current system.
(c) loss consolidation is only permitted within a group of companies located
in the EU. Two companies, or groups of companies, owned by a non-EU
parent are not permitted to consolidate with each other.
(d) participation in the new system is obligatory.
(e) the new system is introduced only in a subgroup of 8 member states.
In each case, we allow only that assumption to be changed: all others re-
main as in the base case.
Accounting for ’unused’ losses: If companies assume that losses accu-
mulated at the end of the planing horizon can be offset in the subsequent period,
they incorporate the value of this into their decision as to whether or not to
participate in the new system.21 As an alternative to the base case, we make
this alternative assumption, both for the existing system and the hypothetical
systems. Technically this means that the decision is given through η˜ in equation
(11) rather than η from equation (8). This lowers the total revenue impact to
a reduction of between 1.8% and 2.2% depending on the apportionment factor,
because some additional corporate groups choose not to participate. The coun-
tries gaining most relative to the base case are Denmark, Finland, Italy the
Netherlands and Poland, while other countries would lose relative to the base
case, notably Austria, Estonia, Greece and the United Kingdom. However, the
21For consistency we also include the tax assets in the tax revenues.
20
relative positions of the countries change little, so we do not present the results
in detail but only the change in the average participation. Figure 3 compares
the percentage of individual companies that participate (with a weighted appor-
tionment factor) to the base case. It can be seen that the participation drops
most in the new member states which reflects the large unused loss positions
that existed under the existing system in 2004 in Eastern European companies.
At the other end of the spectrum, taking into account the unused losses even
increases participation in Denmark and the United Kingdom. This is due to
the fact that under the current system some of the losses are allowed as tax
rebates, which we do not allow in the hypothetical system.
Average Participation (no. of firms)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
AT BE CZ DE DK EE ES F
I
FR GB GR HU IE IT LT LU LV NL PL PT SE SK
losses irrecoverable
losses in 2005
Figure 3: Percentage of companies participating in the new formula appor-
tionment system (by country, with weighted apportionment factor)
Not allowing tax rebates: The previous robustness check indicates that
we are looking at two systems with different treatments of negative tax pay-
ments: in some cases companies receive tax rebates under the existing system;
however we do not permit this under the hypothetical consolidation. In order
to make the comparison more similar, we also consider the case in which no
tax rebates are permitted under the current system, but losses must be carried
forward into the next period. This results in substantially larger tax revenues
under the current system in a number of countries, most notably Spain, Sweden,
Greece, France, Denmark and the United Kingdom. In comparison with these
larger revenues under the existing system, the change to consolidation would
21
reduce revenues in these countries. The Eastern European countries, in partic-
ular Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republic, nevertheless increase their
tax revenues. However, there is no indication that the reported tax rebates were
not paid and ignoring them seems to be a very strong assumption, therefore we
do not want to place to much emphasis on the results of this robustness check.
Not including the EU-affiliates of Non-EU parents. The base case
assumed that the profits and losses of all European subsidiaries within a world-
wide group could be consolidated. This is an issue which is still under debate in
the EU, although our base case is consistent with the proposals in Commission
of the European Communities (2007a). However, to explore this, we instead
allow loss consolidation only up to the European parent. This is achieved by
defining the group as follows. Companies are part of a European group if (a)
within our sample one European company directly or indirectly owns more than
50% of another European company (in which case both companies are part of
the group), or (b) if the database reports a European global owner with a BvD
identification number. This reduces the number of companies within a corpo-
rate group by roughly a quarter.
The results are shown in Figure 4, which is in the same format as Figure 2:
the horizontal line indicates the overall position. Overall, there is little change
from the base case, in that the reduction in total revenue is now limited to
between 1.6% and 2%, depending on the apportionment factor used. The dis-
tribution of changes due to the new system is now also more moderate, with
large changes in tax revenues being moderated. Germany would benefit through
higher revenue in this case, while Slovakia would receive much lower revenue.
The UK would also generate lower revenues compared to the base case. This
could be linked to the relative importance of international (most notably US)
inward investment.
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Obligatory participation. The two previous empirical studies both mod-
elled the formula apportionment system as obligatory.22 To compare our result
to theirs, we also model the new system as obligatory for all companies within
a corporate group. Technically this is done by fixing η = 1 in equation (8).
This forces the companies to offset losses - if they have any - immediately in
their subsidiaries and potentially pay higher taxes on future profits in the same
company. This is of particular importance for corporate groups who have most
of their profits in Ireland. Unfortunately for some of these larger corporate tax
payers we do not have sufficient employment data. In order to analyse a larger
sample, we therefore drop the apportionment according to employment factors
for the obligatory system.
The results are presented in Figure 5, which deviates somewhat from the
format of the other Figures. The upper part of the Figure displays the results
of obligatory consolidation and formula apportionment according to a property
or a gross receipts factor for the original sample, i.e. excluding the companies
that report insufficient employment data. The lower part reports the results of
the same exercise with the larger sample, which now also includes companies
that report insufficient employment data. It is clear that forcing companies to
participate significantly affects the results. Overall, most notably, tax revenues
would now increase by 1.3% with a property factor and 2% with the gross re-
ceipts factor. For the larger sample the increase is even larger, with 2% and
2.9% respectively. This difference is mainly due to the fact that with the larger
sample Ireland now significantly loses tax revenues. The shift of this tax base
into a country with a higher tax rate increases the overall tax revenues signif-
icantly. Comparing the upper and the lower half of Figure 5 it can be noted
that apart from Ireland only Denmark loses substantially more revenue if more
firms are included. 23
Generally, if the consolidation and formula apportionment is obligatory, not
only is the revenue impact much more pronounced, the distribution of tax rev-
enues is also significantly affected relative to the base case. In particular, Spain
now emerges with considerable additional revenue. This is most likely exag-
gerated by the effects of large negative tax payments reported for the Spanish
22See Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) and Fuest et al. (2007).
23This indicates that the additional companies do not change the result qualitatively for
most of the countries. In fact, calculated the other cases for the larger sample as well, and
found that the results are only change to a small extent. The full results are available from
the authors upon request.
24
mobile phone providers under the current system. Nevertheless the fact that
Spain would increase its tax revenues under an obligatory formula apportion-
ment system seems plausible, as the currently high corporate tax rate may
induce some outward profit shifting. For Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
Slovak Republic the new system would continue to raise more revenue, though
Finland would lose a significant part of its revenue regardless the choice of ap-
portionment factor.
By contrast the Netherlands and Ireland, which would gain revenue under
the voluntary system, would lose under an obligatory system. This reflects the
fact that a substantial number of the multinationals with operations (headquar-
ters) in these countries would not participate under the base case assumptions.
The reduction in revenue in the Netherlands is particularly more pronounced
for the property option, which suggests that the companies operating in the
Netherlands have a high profit to assets ratio. This might be expected if the
companies are mainly multinational headquarters. Overall the picture now re-
sembles more closely to Figure 1 with Finland, Denmark and Ireland losing
substantial tax revenues.
25
A
pp
or
tio
ni
ng
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
fa
ct
or
 (o
rig
in
al
 s
am
pl
e)
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
10
0%
11
0%
12
0%
13
0%
14
0%
15
0%
A
T
B
E
C
Z
D
E
D
K
ES
FI
FR
G
B
G
R
H
U
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
N
L
PL
PT
SE
SK
A
pp
or
tio
ni
ng
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 g
ro
ss
 re
ce
ip
ts
 fa
ct
or
 (o
rig
in
al
 s
am
pl
e)
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
10
0%
11
0%
12
0%
13
0%
14
0%
15
0%
A
T
B
E
C
Z
D
E
D
K
ES
FI
FR
G
B
G
R
H
U
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
N
L
PL
PT
SE
SK
A
pp
or
tio
ni
ng
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
fa
ct
or
 (l
ar
ge
r s
am
pl
e)
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
10
0%
11
0%
12
0%
13
0%
14
0%
15
0%
A
T
B
E
C
Z
D
E
D
K
ES
FI
FR
G
B
G
R
H
U
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
N
L
PL
PT
SE
SK
A
pp
or
tio
ni
ng
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 g
ro
ss
 re
ce
ip
ts
 fa
ct
or
 (l
ar
ge
r s
am
pl
e)
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
10
0%
11
0%
12
0%
13
0%
14
0%
15
0%
A
T
B
E
C
Z
D
E
D
K
ES
FI
FR
G
B
G
R
H
U
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
N
L
PL
PT
SE
SK
F
ig
ur
e
5:
T
ax
re
ve
n
u
es
u
n
d
er
a
fo
rm
u
la
ap
p
or
ti
on
m
en
t
sy
st
em
:
O
b
li
ga
to
ry
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
(U
n
u
se
d
lo
ss
es
ir
re
co
ve
ra
b
le
,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
N
on
-E
U
P
ar
en
ts
affi
li
at
es
,
al
l
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
e)
26
Only a subgroup of countries: It is possible that only a subset of coun-
tries would be willing to introduce the new system. We therefore also consider
the case in which only 8 countries take part.24 Clearly this affects the de-
gree of consolidation that can take place. We consider the case in which the
countries taking part are the six founding countries, Germany, France, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and the two countries that already
allow for international loss consolidation, Austria and Denmark. The results
are presented in Figure 6, where the upper part shows the result with voluntary
participation and the lower part the case where all companies are required to
participate.
In the upper part of the Figure, where companies can choose to participate,
total tax revenues must again fall. However, given the limited number of coun-
tries participating, the reduction in the overall tax revenue is lower than in the
base case, with a reduction of approximately 1.5%. In fact the choice of the
apportionment factor has less impact on the distribution if only eight countries
participate. This can be linked to the fact that the participating countries are
more similar than the countries in the rest of the European Union. In par-
ticular the differences between the two payroll factors are now negligible. In
line with the base case, the countries with the highest tax rates, Germany and
Italy lose tax revenue. The countries benefitting from the new system regardless
of the choice of apportionment factors are Austria, the Netherlands and France.
The lower part of Figure 6 shows the tax revenues under an obligatory sys-
tem with only 8 countries participating. This case is almost revenue neutral
with only a slight increase in overall tax revenues up to 0.4%. However, the
tax revenues are more unevenly distributed. Belgium, France, and to a lesser
extent Germany and Italy would gain higher tax revenue, while the smaller
countries like Luxembourg and the Netherlands would face a substantial drop
in tax revenues. The Netherlands in particular would lose roughly a quarter of
the tax revenues if a payroll based apportionment factor were employed. One
reason for this is the relatively large number of headquarters located in the
Netherlands that report high profits, but that employ few people.
24This is the minimum number of countries which could take part.
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Obligatory Participation
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Figure 6: Tax revenues under a formulary apportionment system
(Unused losses irrecoverable, including Non-EU Parents affiliates, only 8
countries participate)
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This last specification is the closest to that of Fuest et al (2007), in that it
assumes that all companies participate and excludes new member states from
the loss consolidation system. In fact we identify broadly the same countries
which gain revenue (Germany, France, Italy) and which lose revenue (Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands). However, in contrast to the 20% decline in tax
revenues identified by Fuest et al. (2007) our results suggest an increase in tax
revenues. This is mainly due to the fact that we add the used losses to future
profits to account for the fact that losses can only be used once. Additionally
we use a broader dataset and a different time period.25 The fact that we cal-
culate the tax revenues rather than the taxable base also contributes to the
overall increase, as a shift of tax base into Germany increases the tax revenues
more than the reduction in a low tax country. This effect is not included in the
calculation of Fuest et al. (2007) as they examine only tax bases.
25 As mentioned by Fuest et al. (2007), German multinational companies exhibited extraor-
dinarily large losses in the relevant period.
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You must pay taxes.
But there’s no law that says you gotta leave a tip.
Morgan Stanley advertisement
7 Conclusion
This paper assesses a recent proposals for an international corporation tax sys-
tem based on loss consolidation and formula apportionment system within the
European Union. We do not model the possibility of a common tax base. We
also abstract from any behavioural response by companies which would affect
their level of profit. However, we allow groups to endogenously choose whether
they participate in the new system.
Using the largest dataset currently available we find that, under our base
case, the corporate tax revenues of the EU Member States would be reduced
by approximately 2.5% on average. However, depending on the exact design
of the apportionment factors, for some countries like the Slovak Republic or
Hungary the tax receipts could increase by up to almost 50%. Their increased
tax income comes primarily at the expense of Germany, Denmark or Italy.
However, if all companies were forced to consolidate and apportion their
profits the total tax payments would increase roughly 2% on average. In this
case, the large and high tax countries would be likely to gain revenue. It should
be noted that the results are highly dependent on the choice of apportionment
factors. This is especially true for the new Member States, where differences in
the share of employees and labour costs are important.
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Table A.1: Data Available from Orbis: Balance Sheet
Item Description Definition Variable
1 Fixed Assets 1a + 1b + 1c FAt
1a Intangible Fixed Assets IFAt
1b Tangible Fixed Assets TFAt
1c Other Fixed Assets OFAt
2 Current Assets 2a + 2b + 2c + 2d CAt
2a Stocks STOt
2b Debtors DBTt
2c Other Current Assets OCAt
2d Cash and Cash Equivalent CSHt
3 Total Assets 1 + 2 TAt
4 Shareholders Funds 4a + 4b SFt
4a Capital CAPt
4b Other Shareholders Funds OSFt
5 Non Current Liabilities 5a + 5b NLt
5a Long Term Debt LTDt
5b Other Non Current Liabilities ONLt
6 Current Liabilities 6a + 6b + 6c CLt
6a Loans LNSt
6b Creditors CRDt
6c Other Current Liabilities OCLt
7 Total Shareholders Funds
and Liabilities 1 + 2 TLt
8 Memo Lines
8a Working Capital 2a + 2b - 6b WKCt
8b Net Current Assets 2 - 6 NCAt
8c Enterprise Value EV At
8d Employees EMPt
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Table A.2: Data Available from Orbis: Profit & Loss Account
Item Description Definition Variable
1 Operating revenue OREVt
1a Sales SALEt
2 Cost of Goods Sold CGDSt
3 Gross Profit 1 - 2 GRPRt
4 Other Operating Expenses OOPEt
5 Operating Profit/Loss
[=EBIT] 3 - 4 EBITt
5a Financial Revenues FREVt
5b Financial Expenses FEXPt
6 Financial Profit/Loss 5a - 5b FPLt
7 Profit/Loss before Tax
and Extraordinary Items 5 - 6 PLBTt
7a Taxation TAXt
8 Profit/Loss after Tax 7 - 7a PLATt
8a Extraordinary Revenues EREVt
8b Extraordinary Expenses EEXPt
9 Extraordinary Profit/Loss 8a - 8b EXPLt
10 Profit/Loss for Period 8 - 9 PRLOt
[=Net Income]
11 Memo Lines
11a Export Turnover EXPt
11b Material costs MATCt
11c Cost of employees CEMPt
11d Depreciation DEPRt
11e Interest paid INTt
11f Cash flow 10 + 11d CFt
11g Added value 7a + 10 + ADDVt
11c + 11d + 11e
11h EBITDA 5 + 11d EBITDAt
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